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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
This manuscript analyzes medical malpractice law from the per-
spective of psycholegal jurisprudence. The discussion begins with a
summary of how tort law functions to serve the needs of patients who
have been harmed by medical malpractice. The underlying assump-
tion of the psycholegal approach is that the law acts most fundamen-
tally to educate patients, physicians, and lawyers about morally
acceptable professional behavior. Based on this assumption I argue
that replacing implicit standards of medical care with empirically de-
rived guidelines would better serve patients and physicians alike.
In support of this thesis I first present a detailed summary of mal-
practice law featuring the role of expert witnesses in litigation. The
theme of the manuscript is that by treating disputes as experimental
stimuli and expert physicians as respondents, it is possible to experi-
mentally evaluate judgments made by physicians concerning alterna-
tive treatment plans associated with each medical dispute. This
experimental approach allows the researcher to empirically derive ex-
plicit standards of care for common types of malpractice cases. In-
cluded is a discussion of the reasons why an empirical technique used
to define medical standards of care should be guided not only by the
requirements of rigorous scientific methods but also by legal doctrine.
Specifically, I examine some of the issues involved in sampling a group
of physicians whose testimony would be accepted in various
jurisdictions.
Following a detailed discussion of relevant law is an examination of
past attempts to reform malpractice doctrine. Analyses based on em-
pirical and economic approaches, as well as an analysis based on
psycholegal jurisprudence support the proposition that explicit stan-
dards would be useful in preventing and litigating malpractice dis-
putes. I argue that the use of such standards would have distinct
advantages over previous reforms in the medical malpractice adjudica-
tion process. I next present a decision aid methodology borrowed
from cognitive and social psychology that allows standards of care to
be defined by sampling the customary and normative practices of a
legally relevant group of expert physicians. The manuscript ends with
a discussion of some of the specific advantages of the empirical
methodology.
B. Tort Law and Victims of Medical Malpractice
In the final analysis the standard that speaks most directly to the
efficacy of the modern medical malpractice system is the quality of
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care available to patients.1 The tort system serves at least four sepa-
rate functions, each of which influences the quality of available care.
First, dispute resolution appeals to the retributive interests of those
who have been injured. When caused by a culpable party, medical er-
rors or "accidents" often engender a need for personal and social pay
back. Victims of medical malpractice use the tort system so that
"wrongdoers can be... called to account and made to pay for their
transgressions." 2
Second, malpractice law provides compensation for injury suffered
by patients at the hands of negligent physicians. However, it is doubt-
ful that the tort system is an adequate source of compensation for a
significant number of plaintiffs. Although average jury awards for
malpractice cases rose from $404,726 in 1980 to $954,858 in 1983,3 it has
been reported that estimates of the amount plaintiffs actually received
ranged from a low of 18 percent to a high of only 54 percent of the
total awards.4 The rest of these funds were used to pay legal and ad-
ministrative fees. Further evidence comes from data collected in Cali-
fornia during the mid-1970's that documents the small likelihood that
tort claims result from iatrogenic harm. Relying on this data, one re-
searcher 5 estimated that only 20 percent of negligently inflicted inju-
ries are likely to lead to tort claims. Furthermore, only four paid
claims resulted from every 100 injuries. Although the generalizability
of this data is limited by sample location as well as adequacy of mea-
suring devices, it does suggest that a relatively small group of injured
patients receive most of the tort recoveries, and that the recoveries are
substantially reduced by the costs of running the tort system, for ex-
ample, attorney fees and other litigation costs.
Third, it is argued that a function of tort law is to reduce the preva-
lence of substandard care by deterring physicians from engaging in
negligent conduct. Intuitive theories of physician behavior predict
that the threat of tort action causes doctors to avoid the kinds of negli-
gent error that result in large recoveries for plaintiffs and higher in-
surance premiums for themselves. However, "[e]mpirical data are
almost wholly lacking .... ,,6 A review of the available empirical re-
search suggests that individual plaintiffs collect large sums of money
from malpractice claims, yet not enough victims bring causes of action
1. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial Quality of Care is Still the Important
Standard, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 321 (1986).
2. Id. at 325.
3. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation Reports, 292 CURRENT AWARD
TRENDS 18 (1985).
4. Zuckerman,Koller, & Bobvjerg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empir-
ical Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1986).
5. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POUCY (1985).
6. Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 329.
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to effectively deter medical negligence.7
A final function of medical malpractice law is to act as a moral
educator for physicians and plaintiffs. Some law and psychology
scholars argue that the law acts primarily to "establish the structures
for implementation of the values" of society and "to announce social
norms, to provide cues for moral. behavior."8 An emerging school of
psycholegal jurisprudence views the law not as an agent that alters
the basic values of the community but rather as an educator that in-
forms the members of the community about morally appropriate be-
havior in a variety of circumstances. The force of the law as a
behavioral instrument lies not in its coercive or deterrent capabilities,
but rather in its ability to motivate through symbolic meaning. Under
this analysis, tort law in general and malpractice law specifically
shape behavior by providing examples, expectancies, and behavioral
cues that direct and motivate reasonably prudent behavior. It in-
structs potential tortfeasors about the standards of care that should
guide their ordinary and professional behavior. It is in the role as pro-
fessional educator that tort law may have its most profound impact on
the quality of care available to patients.
C. The Need for an Explicit Standard of Care
It is the major thesis of this paper that medical malpractice law
falls short as a moral educator. It is unable to instruct physicians, pa-
tients, and attorneys about the social expectations of doctors treating
specific problems because it relies on an implicit standard of care that
is never fully articulated. The standard of care to which doctors are
held accountable is the customary care adhered to by practicing physi-
cians.9 The standard is only made explicit when a patient brings a
medical malpractice suit, and then it is based only on the testimony of
one or two members of the profession. In defense of implicit stan-
dards of care, one might point out that the law is in a constant state of
flux and that it would be difficult to develop rules to accommodate all
conceivable medical problems. However, this excuse does not prevent
the law from formulating temporary but explicit standards for the
more common medical procedures. The temporary nature of medical
standards of care necessitate that any empirical system used to codify
guidelines be easily repeatable at later times so that the standards
themselves may be easily modified. Despite these limitations, the fact
that the standard is constantly changing should not prevent the law
from making explicit the temporary consensus that is meant to guide
7. DANZON, supra note 5.
8. Melton & Saks, The Law as an Instrument ofSocialization and Social Structure,
33 NEBRAsKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 235 (1985).
9. Keeton, Medical Malpractice: The Standard of Care, 10 TEX. TEcH L. REv. 351
(1977).
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the behavior of physicians and shape the expectations of patients. The
medical standard is a guideline based on custom, and in the final anal-
ysis custom is an empirical question. Only when the law defines cus-
tomary practice in specific terms will it function as a moral educator of
physicians.
The remainder of this manuscript discusses the need to make the
standard of care owed by physicians explicit. The need for an explicit
standard is discussed primarily from the perspective of psycholegal ju-
risprudence. Ultimately, I present a methodology borrowed from de-
cision making and applied social psychology which may be used to
develop an empirical standard of care in medical malpractice law.
Specifically, I advocate the use of a variant of Multiple Attribute Util-
ity Theory (MAUT) to explicate the standard of care as it is implicitly
understood by a consensus of practicing physicians. Before presenting
this model it is necessary to highlight in some detail professional negli-
gence law as it pertains to medical malpractice. While the specific
techniques that make up MAUT are psychological in nature, applying
the decision aid to a legal problem requires a sophisticated under-
standing of the law.
II. THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. The Medical Standard of Care and Harm Caused by its Breach
The law holds professionals to a standard of care different than
ordinary duty:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is re-
quired to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of
that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.1 0
According to this language, members of learned professions who pos-
sess skill and knowledge that exceed that of the ordinary person are
required to maintain their professional conduct at a level that is con-
sistent with the skill and knowledge normally possessed and exercised
by other members of their profession in similar circumstances."
The determination of whether the professional has demonstrated
the customary standard of care usually requires the expert testimony
of some member of the defendant's profession.12 This is in contrast to
ordinary negligence in which the standard of care owed is evaluated
from the perspective of the reasonably prudent person acting in simi-
lar circumstances. However, in cases of professional negligence the
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
11. King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The 'Accepted
Practice' Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1235 (1975).
12. Id. 1236.
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law requires testimony of an expert to assist the fact finder in estab-
lishing the professional standard of care because the typical juror is
not well enough versed in the conduct of the profession to be able to
do so without assistance.
As applied in cases of medical malpractice, the professional stan-
dard of care is the knowledge, skill, and judgment customarily pos-
sessed and applied by some community of physicians acting in similar
or like cases. Whereas custom is merely evidence of ordinary care in
the law of ordinary negligence, it is conclusive in cases of medical neg-
ligence. In most medical malpractice cases the law requires that the
standard of care be established through the expert testimony of a phy-
sician, unless the defendant doctor's conduct is so obviously negligent
that it is within the common knowledge of a jury to conclude that the
conduct was unacceptable under the conditions of the case at bar.13
An example of the need for expert testimony in medical malprac-
tice negligence was outlined in Koch v. Gorrilla.14 The court con-
cluded that because the plaintiff had not proffered an expert witness
familiar with the customary standard of care in either the defendant's
community or a similar community, there was no cause of action for
wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband arising from negligence in
treating the decedent's ruptured appendix. The Koch Court, quoting
the Michigan Supreme Court in Lince v. Monson,15 stated the law as
follows:
In a case involving professional service the ordinary layman is not equipped by
common knowledge and experience to judge of the skill and competence of
that service and determine whether it squares with the standard of such pro-
fessional practice in the community. For that, the aid of expert testimony
from those learned in the profession involved is required. 1 6
This language summarizes the law of most jurisdictions.
The only cases in which expert witnesses are not needed to estab-
lish the due care owed to patients are those rare situations in which
jurors possess sufficient common knowledge to decide whether the ac-
tions of physicians constitute malpractice. Some vivid examples of
these cases include,
when a surgeon sews up in his patient a lap pack, a sponge, or a jagged piece of
glass from a broken test tube.... Expert evidence is not required in cases of
clear neglect of or inattention to the patient by the doctor, because resolving
such cases does not require any understanding of technical medical knowledge
13. For a review of case law holding that an expert witness is needed to establish the
customary standard of care in medical malpractice see generally, F. HARPER, F.
JAmS, & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 17.1 at 551-59 (1986), and D. LOUISELL &
H. WILLIAmS, MEDICAL MALPRACnCE § 29.01 (1989).
14. 552 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1977).
15. 363 Mich. 135, 139-140, 108 N.W.2d 845, 847-48 (1961).
16. Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170, 1174 (6th Cir. 1977).
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and skill of their application. 1 7
For example, in Waynick v. Reardon,18 the court held that expert tes-
timony was not necessary to establish the standard of care when per-
foration of a patient's veins and arteries during minor surgery caused
the patient to suffer a heart attack, amputation of both legs and drug
addiction. Therefore, in those cases in which a physician commits a
clerical error by inadvertence or forgetfulness which leads to an injury
that would not have occurred without gross carelessness most courts
allow juries to infer negligence without the aid of expert testimony.19
In summary, the law defines the duty of physicians according to
the existing community of professional behavior. It is peculiar that
while the courts recognize the professionals themselves as the only
appropriate population from which to fashion a duty of care for
physicians, the courts are willing to allow the testimony of one or two
experts to represent the behavior of an entire community of practi-
tioners. From a psycholegal perspective, it is questionable whether a
sample of one or two exceptional doctors are aware of and are able to
articulate the customary practices of a community of colleagues. Un-
less one is willing to assume that all physicians adhere implicitly to
the same standards of practice for a particular medical procedure, it is
not obvious that one or two doctors, no matter how carefully they are
selected, will be capable of summarizing the medical standard sub-
scribed to by an entire community of physicians. Further, there is no
reason to believe that expert witnesses are chosen because they are
exceptionally well trained physicians. More likely, they are a sample
biased toward compliance with either the plaintiff or defendant, de-
pending upon who they represent in any particular case. If the objec-
tive of the law is to use expert witnesses to operationalize the medical
standard of care, the validity of the approach (the veridicality of the
evidence as an accurate estimate of customary practice) would be
greatly enhanced if a larger sample of doctors were allowed to give
testimony. If the sample were more representative of the community
of physicians and if the biases of a variety of practitioners were consid-
ered, then the errors of each individual expert would be balanced by
the countervailing biases of his or her colleagues.
After the plaintiff establishes the customary standard of care, he or
she must proffer expert testimony to demonstrate that the defend-
ant's actions breached the standard and that the negligent act of the
defendant was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff.20 In general, expert testimony must establish
17. Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REV. 711, 714-15
(1984).
18. 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952).
19. Keeton, supra note 9, at 359.
20. F. HARPER, F. JAMEs, & 0. GRAY, supra note 13 and D. LOUISELL AND H. Win-
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that it is more probable than not that the defendant's act of negligence
was responsible for the resulting harm. For example, in Smith v.
Knowles,2 ' Mrs. Smith, pregnant and apparently suffering from ec-
lampsia - toxemia of pregnancy - was diagnosed by her physician
only on the same day that the doctor admitted her to the hospital for
treatment. She was administered magnesium sulphate to treat the
condition, but it was too late to prevent the convulsions that claimed
the lives of her and her unborn child. Unable to produce a physician
to testify about the customary standard of care in diagnosis and treat-
ment of eclampsia, the plaintiff relied on the testimony of the defend-
ant, Dr. Knowles, and cross examination of the defendant with regard
to medical treatises to try and establish the definition of standard
care.22 The court ruled that the plaintiff had not presented expert
testimony to show that Dr. Knowles had departed from the standard.
There was no expert testimony that his diagnosis, given the facts of
the case, was so untimely as to be in violation of the customary stan-
dard of care.2 3 The court went on to say:
Even more troubling, however, is the lack of expert testimony on the causa-
tion elements of the plaintiff's claims.... The plaintiff had the burden to
prove, by expert testimony, that... it was more probable that death resulted
from some negligence for which the defendant was responsible than from
something for which he was not responsible.24
A showing that the defendant breached a duty and that the breach
was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the injury suffered is an
essential ingredient in all cases of negligence and of special concern in
professional malpractice law. Medical malpractice cases like Smith
may turn on proof of causality. Because the plaintiff is required to
proffer expert witnesses to establish causality, and because the courts
rely on the evidence of only a few physicians, the same sampling con-
cerns that are discussed above in connection with establishing the
standard of care apply to drawing accurate conclusions of breach of
duty and causality. However, the purpose of this manuscript lies in
establishing empirical definitions of medical standards of care.
Although establishing empirical evidence for breach of duty and its
consequential harm is within the capabilities of psychological re-
search, a psycholegal analysis of breach of duty and causality are be-
yond the boundaries of this discussion.
LIAiS, supra note 13, at § 29.02, present collections of the case law in a variety of
jurisdictions supporting this point in medical malpractice law and other areas of
professional negligence.
21. 281 N.W2d 653 (Minn. 1979).
22. The court held that because Minnesota adopted FED. R. EVED. 803(18), medical
treatises were allowed to be admitted as substantive evidence once they are
shown to be reliable authorities. Id. at 656.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Silver v. Redleaf, 292 Minn. 463, 465, 194 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1972)).
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B. Qualifications of Expert Witnesses
An empirical definition of medical standards of care needs to very
carefully select populations of physicians from which to draw a sam-
ple. The sample must not be representative of merely any group of
qualified doctors. It must be drawn from a sample of physicians who
possess "skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession of trade in good standing."25 In other words, the sample
must not only be externally valid from a scientific perspective, it must
also be legally valid according to the law of the jurisdiction in which it
will be proffered as evidence. Although there are some generalities
across states, the legal definition of standard of care varies somewhat
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Therefore, expert witness qualifica-
tions also vary across states. For the purposes of presenting evidence
in malpractice disputes, researchers need to be sure that their samples
agree with the court's holdings with regard to locality rules, specialist
issues and knowledge qualifications for expert witnesses.
1. Locality
Probably the single most discussed qualification of expert wit-
nesses has been familiarity with the standard of care in the commu-
nity in which the defendant-physician has practiced. Historically,
courts were reluctant to hold physicians in rural areas to the same
standard of care as doctors from larger metropolises.26 Because rural
physicians were often isolated from news of medical advancements, it
was reasoned that they should not have been held accountable for
mastering the advanced technology available in the larger cities. This
philosophy was translated into common law by the strict "locality
rule" which required that expert witnesses be familiar with the cus-
tomary practice of the physicians who treated patients in the commu-
nity in which the defendant practiced.27 For example, Maryland
courts follow Dunham v. Elder,28 which states that "the plaintiff must
show that the defendant-physician failed to exercise the amount of
care, skill and diligence... which is exercised generally in the commu-
nity.... in which he was practicing."29 However, in Raitt v. Johns
Hopkins Hospital,3 0 the Maryland Court of Appeals stated "the expert
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 299A (1965).
26. Kibble-Smith & Hafner, The Effect of the Information Age on Professional Lia-
bility, 36 DE PAUL L. REV. 69, 71 (1986).
27. For a review of the case law concerning the current status of the locality rule see,
Annotation, Malpractice Testimony: Competency of Physician or Surgeon from
One Locality to Testify, in Malpractice Case, as to Standard of Care Required of
Defendant Practicing in Another Locality, 37 A.L.RI3d 420 (1971).
28. 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973).
29. Id. at 364, 306 A.2d at 571 (quoting State v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 195, 179 A.2d 349,
353 (1962)).
30. 274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975).
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witness need only possess such knowledge of the applicable standard
of care as will enable him to render an informed opinion. There is no
absolute requirement that he practice or reside in the defendant-phy-
sician's community."3 ' The Maryland holdings are representative of
strict locality rules.
Research undertaken to provide empirical definitions of standards
of care in strict locality jurisdictions should sample only those physi-
cians who practice in the defendant's community or for some special
reason are knowledgeable about customary practice in that commu-
nity. Fortunately, strict locality jurisdictions make up the minority of
state courts.
According to some commentators,3 2 courts criticized the strict lo-
cality rule because it held rural communities to a lower standard of
care based on the fact that more efficacious technologies were not
readily available in those areas. Holding rural areas to a lower stan-
dard of care assured that the medical treatment available to inhabit-
ants of rural communities would be substandard. In addition, the
strict locality rule limited expert witnesses to only those who were
willing to testify against fellow doctors practicing in the same commu-
nity. The reluctance of physicians to testify against other doctors, the
"conspiracy of silence,"33 made it very nearly impossible to bring a
successful cause of action in smaller communities within jurisdictions
that required expert witnesses to be familiar with the local standards
of customary practice. The courts denied plaintiffs the opportunity to
present physicians practicing in distant locations who would not be
susceptible to local conspiracy of silence pressures.
As communication technology advanced and physicians in urban
and rural areas became informed of medical advancements almost as
rapidly as they appeared, the need for a strict locality rule has dimin-
ished.34 In the words of the Court of Appeals of the D. C. Circuit:
"Modem medical education and postgraduate training have been na-
tionalized. Scientific information flows freely among medical institu-
tions throughout the country. Professional journals and numerous
other means of continuing education are national in scope."3 5
Influenced by the technological advancements in communications,
many jurisdictions have liberalized the locality rule and have adopted
less restrictive requirements for expert witnesses. Today, most juris-
dictions follow the "similar locality" rule which has been summarized
as 'a physician's conduct is judged by the standard of care of a reason-
31. Id. at 500, 336 A.2d at 96.
32. Kibble-Smith & Hafner, supra note 26.
33. Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHEL L. REV.
417, 423 (1936).
34. Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 128.
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ably competent physician practicing in the same or similar communi-
ties."3 6 Thus, the expert witness must show that he is familiar with
the customary care that is practiced either in the defendant's commu-
nity or a community that is similar in terms of size, geographic loca-
tion, and level of sophistication of medical technology.
Studies of medical standards in most jurisdictions should draw
samples of physicians in accordance with the similar locality rule. As-
suming all other factors are equal (i.e., professional and specialty sta-
tus and knowledge of the procedure) doctors who practice in the
defendant physician's community, or in other communities that are
similar in size, location, and technology, should be familiar with the
customary practices in the defendant's community or in similar com-
munities. While it might be legally defensible to sample physicians
who profess to be familiar with the standards of communities in which
they do not practice, such sampling leaves the researcher open to the
argument that the respondents were not knowledgeable of the defend-
ant's community even though they might have reported to the re-
searcher that they were knowledgeable of the customs.
On the other hand, in most jurisdictions it would be difficult to
argue that a physician practicing in the defendant's community or in
similar communities was not familiar with the customary standards of
care within her or his own community of practice. This would be espe-
cially true if the physician had been practicing in that community for
an extended period of time. It would be an unusual doctor who had a
stable practice in a community, but who was not familiar with the
standard of care in that community. Expanding this logic to an entire
sample of respondents selected because they practiced in the defend-
ant's community or a similar community makes it even more likely
that the consensus of such a sample would be enlightened regarding
the customs of the communities in which they practice.
Other responses to the strict locality rule fashioned a general
neighborhood rule which allows physicians who practice in the same
general neighborhood as the defendant to testify as experts. The gen-
eral neighborhood is often interpreted as an extension of the strict
locality rule so as to permit as expert witnesses physicians who do not
live in the same community as the defendant, but who practice in a
community within the same geographic area. For example, in Fitz-
maurice v. Flynn37 the court interpreted general neighborhood to
mean that any physician practicing within the state was qualified, in
terms of locality, to offer expert testimony against any other physician
practicing in the state. In states with neighborhood rules, a legally
valid sample should constitute a representative sample of physicians
36. Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 141 Ill. App. 3d 538, 544, 490 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1986).
37. 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975).
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who practice in either the defendant's community or neighboring ar-
eas. Under Fitzmaurice, such a sample would select only physicians
who practiced within the borders of that state.
Given the status of modern communication networks the small
town practitioner may have a duty to refer if he or she does not pos-
sess the equipment necessary for up to date treatment. It has been
argued that rural physicians should no longer be protected by even
liberal locality rules, given the widespread availability of current med-
ical knowledge to physicians in even the most rural areas.38 Others3 9
argue that as access to electronically stored biomedical information
becomes universal in the form of full text, computer assisted litera-
ture search devices, such as MEDIS,40 there will be little practical rea-
son to maintain anything other than a national standard of customary
care. Some jurisdictions, although few in number, have indeed
adopted a national standard of care. For example, in Carbone v.
Warburton,41 the New Jersey Supreme court failed to restrict the ad-
missibility of an expert witness based on any locality considerations
and this has been taken to support the conclusion that New Jersey
follows a national standard of medical care.
If a national standard of care is adopted in a large number of states,
then for the purposes of empirical definitions of standards of care, the
locality attributes of a sample of physicians will become irrelevant. It
is possible that the presumed differences in customary care that are
protected by the various locality rules are not empirically verifiable.
In other words, given the technological sophistication of today's mod-
ern communications networks, customary care for specific medical
problems may not vary more among doctors practicing in different lo-
calities than they do among physicians practicing within the same lo-
cality. This is, of course, an empirical issue which can only be
answered by comparing samples of physicians between and within lo-
cal jurisdictions. Establishing empirical standards of care and compar-
ing them across jurisdictions would go a long way toward determining
whether locality rules are based on more than legal fictions.
2. Standard of Care for Specialists
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has
superior skill or knowledge than that common to his profession or
38. Michaud & Hutton, Medical Tort Law: The Emergence of a Specialty Standard of
Care, 16 TULSA L.J. 720, 730 (1981).
39, Kibble-Smith & Hafner, supra note 26, at 87.
40. MEDIS is a full text computerized data base published by Mead Inc. It is similar
to the LEXIS system familiar to legal scholars. MEDIS makes available to any
physician who has access to a personal computer and modem, the full text of all
major medical journal treatises.
41. 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
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trade. In that event he incurs an obligation to the person to whom he
makes such a representation, to have, and to exercise, the skill and
knowledge which he represents himself to have. Thus a physician
who holds himself out as a specialist in certain types of practice is re-
quired to have the skill and knowledge common to other specialists.42
It is well documented that most jurisdictions hold medical special-
ists to the skill and knowledge of other specialists. 43 In a recent case,
Snead v. United States,44 the court found in favor of a plaintiff who
suffered from cervical cancer which her gynecologist failed to detect,
in part, because he did not perform a PAP smear on the plaintiff when
she complained of heavy menstrual periods. Applying a specialist
standard the court stated, "[n]ationally-certified specialists in gynecol-
ogy .... [a]re required to have and to exercise that degree of care, skill
and learning ordinarily possessed and used by a nationally-certified
specialist in gynecology acting in the same or similar circumstances."4 5
Once again, the issue of qualifications is shaped by locality. Vary-
ing across jurisdictions, certified specialists are held to the customary
standard of like specialists practicing in the same community, the
same or similar communities, or the same state. Some courts, like the
Snead court, have recognized that the national communication net-
work is sufficiently advanced so that all specialists should be held to a
common medical standard, irrespective of their geographic location.
As with non-specialty standards of care, expert testimony is judged to
be admissible or inadmissible based on the locality in which the ex-
pert-physician practices, and whether the expert is familiar with the
customary practice of specialists in the locality of the defendant.
Although an expert witness need only be familiar with customary
practice in the specialty area of the defendant physician, it would be
prudent for research establishing empirical standards to select only
those respondents who share with the defendant the specialty area of
practice. Alternatively, it may be acceptable for a sample of mixed
specialists and non-specialists to give evidence about a standard of care
for a procedure normally performed by specialists but which was per-
formed by a nonspecialist defendant in the case at bar. Any decision
of whether to sample specialists or nonspecialists or some mixture of
the two groups should be guided by the specialty rules of the jurisdic-
tion in which the dispute arises. The only sure way to determine
42. RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment d (1965).
43. For a review of the case law concerning the current status of the standard of care
for specialists see Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Spe-
cialist as Determined by Local, "Like Community," State, National or Other
Standards, 18 A.L.R.4th 603 (1982).
44. 595 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1984).
45. Id. at 663.
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whether a sample is likely to be legally valid is to examine the case
law in the jurisdiction in which the cause of action is filed.
Because the medical profession has adopted a national standard for
membership for most of its specialties, allowing geographic considera-
tions to limit the quality of care required in less urbanized areas is
indefensible.46 Testimony of medical experts may very well show a
great deal of variation, but it is doubtful whether the variation is at-
tributable to geographic locality. Indeed, if the purpose of qualifying
expert witnesses by locality is to protect the practitioner from stan-
dards of care that require technologies available only in urban centers,
it is difficult to argue in favor of specialty standards of care that are
limited by geography, given the sophistication of communication and
transportation systems that are prevalent in our society. Whether
these theories47 are correct is an important issue in medical malprac-
tice law. This presents a testable hypothesis that has -pronounced im-
plications for litigation. An appropriate test of the hypothesis requires
comparing empirical standards of care among specialists and non-
specialists within and across jurisdictions. The outcome would predict
that the comparisons across geographic samples within the same spe-
cialties would show relatively little variation. Empirical studies of
standards of care within and between specialty areas would indeed be
informative to malpractice law.
3. Knowledge Qualifwations for Expert Witnesses
The determination of the competency and qualifications of an ex-
pert witness is normally left to the discretion of the trial judge. Un-
less the judge has abused her or his discretion or shows a clear error
arising from a misconception of law, appellate courts are reluctant to
overturn a decision made by the trial court. Nonetheless, most juris-
dictions follow the general rule that the medical expert must be famil-
iar with the disputed procedure in the case at bar unless the procedure
is so unique that the defendant is the only physician who is familiar
with the technique.4 8 At one time California courts required that the
expert's familiarity result from direct "occupational experience" with
the procedure in question.49 Although California no longer adheres to
the "occupational experience" rule, 0 Utah does require expert medi-
cal witnesses to have personal experience performing the disputed
46. Michaud & Hutton supra note 38.
47. Id.
48. A discussion of this rule is presented in Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Neces-
sity and Sufficiency of Showing of Medical Witness'Familiarity with Particular
Medical or Surgical Technique Involved in Suit, 46 A.L.R.3d 275 (1972).
49. Pearce v. Linde, 113 Cal. App. 2d 627, 248 P.2d 506 (1952).
50. See Miller v. Silver, 181 Cal. App. 3d 652, 226 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1986).
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procedure.51
In most jurisdictions the expert witness must be familiar with the
disputed technique but need not have direct experience in performing
the procedure. Carbone v. Warburton52 summarizes the rule followed
by the courts in a number of jurisdictions when examining the qualifi-
cations of expert witnesses:
The inquiry is directed to the witness' knowledge and experience in the care
and treatment of the illness or injury in suit to enable the trial judge to deter-
mine whether the witness has sufficient acquaintance with the standards rec-
ognized and applied by the medical profession in the situation under
investigation to justify his expression of an opinion. Such acquaintance does
not necessarily depend upon personal experience with like situations. It may
equally be established from evidence of the witness' observations of the things
done by fellow practitioners or of the witness' reading and study of treatises
and medical journals upon the subject.53
In most jurisdictions, whether the practitioner has ever performed
the procedure in question goes to determining the weight that the jury
assigns to the expert's testimony. However, if samples of physicians
are to be used to establish empirical standards of care, it is necessary
that the respondents have had either direct experience or indirect ex-
perience with the procedures in dispute. After examining the case law
in a specific jurisdiction, the researcher should devise a set of ques-
tions to be answered in written or oral form which inquire as to
whether the respondent is familiar with the medical problem that is at
the heart of the dispute. Physicians who are not familiar enough with
the procedures to be able to provide a knowledgeable response should
be eliminated from the sample. Descriptive statistics should be pro-
vided to demonstrate that the respondents possessed an acceptable un-
derstanding of the procedures involved in the case at bar. Absent this
data, the court may very well decide that the research evidence is not
admissible.
In summary, I have argued that medical standards of care need em-
pirical and explicit definitions. However, a psycholegal analysis of the
law demonstrates that for such standards of care to be meaningful to
the courts as well as to psychological researchers, the samples of phy-
sicians must be not only externally valid (generalizable to a meaning-
ful population) in a psychological sense, they must also be legally
valid. That is, the sample of respondents must be selected from a pop-
ulation that meets the locality, specialty, and knowledge rules of the
jurisdiction in which the case has been filed. While I have shown that
samples may be drawn to satisfy legal requirements, my arguments
have not yet considered why modifications would be beneficial. That
is, if the medical malpractice system is not broken, why should it be
51. Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1987).
52. 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
53. Id. at 425, 94 A.2d at 683.
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fixed? I turn now to some issues of public policy which favor an em-
pirical approach to malpractice law.
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISES AND THE NEED FOR
REFORM
Professional negligence law was put to a severe test during the
mid-1970's. The number and size of medical malpractice suits grew at
a rate alarming enough to cause a number of insurers to leave the
market.54 For example, the St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Com-
pany, a leading provider of medical malpractice insurance, reported an
increase in claim rates from about 1 for every 23 physicians in 1969 to 1
for every 10 in 1974 and a doubling of average claim payments from
1969 to 1975.m5 It is argued that as a result a number of doctors found
it difficult to obtain insurance even at very high premiums. Because
of the scarcity of insurance, the situation in the mid-1970's was re-
ferred to as the "crisis of availability."56
One commentator 57 discussed and rejected the decline in standards
54. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AMERIcAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1110,
1112 (1989). In viewing the evidence for a general tort liability crisis, Saks draws
into question the conclusion that there has been an uncommon and rapid increase
in tort litigation. Saks criticizes the logic that points to a crisis in tort litigation
because the crisis claims are based on anecdotes, unadjusted aggregate data, and
cause and effect inferences that have not been adequately tested. See also Ga-
lanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Saks, In
Search of the 'Lawsuit Crisis", 14 LAW, MED., & HEALTH CARE 77 (1986); and
Saks, Zf there be a crisi, how shall we know it?, 46 MD. L. REv. 63 (1986).
Although studies have shown an increase in the number of tort filings, trials, and
winning cases by the plaintiffs, such data in the absence of adequate comparison
conditions do not lead conclusively to the conclusion that a crisis is occurring. See
infra notes 73-78 and the accompanying text for a discussion of some data docu-
menting increases in medical malpractice claims and recoveries. Logic demands
that a conclusion supporting an extensive general tort crisis must be based on
data that have controlled for all plausible rival hypotheses. One of the most sali-
ent rival hypothesis is that the observed increase in claims and winnings simply
reflects the possibility that the base rate of injuries has been increasing. Trans-
lating to the specific crisis in medical malpractice, it is possible that observed in-
creases in insurance claims, number of filed claims, and recoveries are true
positives. See infr for a discussion of the distinction between true positives -
the plaintiff's decision to pursue a law suit after being harmed by a physician's
negligence, and false positives - the plaintiff's decision to file a claim when the
cause of harm is simply the failure of medical knowledge and technology (or the
result of a chance event). In other words, the increased claims and recoveries
might have resulted from actual increases in iatrogenic injury that were caused
by negligence. Clearly more research is needed to clarify the extent to which the
observed increases in medical malpractice claims represent increases in false
positives.
55. Qual, supra note 33, at 420.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW
& CoNTEmp. PRoBs. 5 (1986).
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of medical practice as a possible cause of the dramatic rise in malprac-
tice suits. More probable causes include an increase in risk of ia-
trogenic injury as a function of advances in highly technical but
somewhat dangerous medical methods, an increase in the public's ex-
pectations of medical outcomes resulting in greater levels of dissatis-
faction and higher probabilities of bringing suit for injuries, and an
increase in both the number and aggressiveness of lawyers, especially
in light of the contingent fee structure that drives the tort system. 8
While each of these factors is an arguable cause, most writers focused
on the liberalization of tort doctrine during the late 1960's. Critics
maintained that changes in medical malpractice law encouraged more
frequent and sizable claims, and increased the probability of recovery.
Notable alterations included a relaxing of the locality rule, al-
lowing plaintiffs to proffer expert witnesses from communities similar
to those of the defendant or in states adopting a national standard (es-
pecially for specialists) from communities far apart in geographic and
social distance.59 As a result expert witnesses were more readily iden-
tified and it became easier to establish prima facie cases of negligence.
Other changes in procedural and substantive tort law included length-
ening the statute of limitations by adopting a discovery rule,60 loosen-
ing proof requirements by widening the type of cases in which the
common knowledge of the jury was sufficient to define the standard of
care, and making increasingly available the principle of res ipsa
loquitor.61
58. Id. at 11-18.
59. Qual, supra note 33.
60. A tort case must be brought within a specified of time period or recovery is
barred by the statute of limitations. While different jurisdictions follow statutes
of limitations of various lengths, the cause of action accrues in traditional com-
mon law when the harm occurs. Once the claim is filed, the statute stops run-
ning. It is traditional in medical malpractice law that the statute commences
running at the time of the injury even if the plaintiff is unaware of the harm
suffered. Because the traditional rule is a harsh one for the plaintiff, a number of
states in the 1960's and 1970's adopted a discovery rule which held that the statute
begins to run only when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
injury. The language of the Oregon Supreme Court in Schiele v. Hobart Corp.,
284 Or. 483, 490, 587 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1978), is instructive: "The statute of limita-
tions begins to run when a reasonably prudent person associates his symptoms
with a serious or permanent condition and at the same time perceives the role
which the defendant has played in inducing that condition." Adopting a discov-
ery rule makes it easier for plaintiffs who suffer injuries that remain latent for
long periods of time to bring suit. For plaintiffs filing in states with a discovery
rule, the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiffs discover or should have
discovered their symptoms and connect the symptoms to the physician's negli-
gence. Claims that are not filed until the symptoms are discovered, even if it is
years after the injury occurred, are not barred by elapsed statutes of limitations.
Thus the discovery rules may have precipitated the medical malpractice crisis by
having made it easier for victims to file claims.
61. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) defines res ipsa loquitor as:
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As a result of the crisis of availability, almost all states enacted
some form of legislation to curb the increases in medical malpractice
claims. One general strategy was to limit the plaintiffs' access to the
courts.62 For example, some states passed legislation that modified
the discovery rule by incorporating absolute time limits beyond which
claims could not be brought. Other states enacted legislation allowing
health care providers and patients to enter into voluntary arbitration
to try and resolve any disputes arising from health care transactions.
In a related vein, pretrial screening panels have been established to
screen out claims without legal merit. The decisions of the panels are
not binding;, therefore, the decisions do not necessarily preclude a law
suit if the plaintiffs' cases are found to be without merit. In some
states the panels' decisions are admissible in court and in others they
are not. There is a great deal of controversy concerning the efficacy of
arbitration and screening panels. Although attorneys tend to disfavor
these approaches, believing that they result in double litigation, for-
mal studies of screening panels concluded that in several states they
reduced the number of malpractice claims reaching the courts.63
While studies of the effectiveness of arbitration agreements are not
conclusive, one author6 4 reviewed existing data and concluded that ar-
bitration provisions are effective in reducing the number of claims
filed and the costs of dispute resolution.
A second approach of reform legislation attempted to alter the
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negli-
gence of the defendant when (a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes,
including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
Res ipsa loquitor instructions are given to a jury in medical malpractice cases if it
is judged that an iatrogenic injury could not have occurred unless the defendant-
physician acted negligently, the defendant was in control of the instrument that
caused the harm at the time of the injury, and all other plausible causes (includ-
ing action by the plaintiff) can be eliminated. Res ipsa instructions allow a jury to
decide in favor of a plaintiff simply by concluding that negligence was more likely
than not, i.e, "the thing speaks for itself." For example, juries usually receive res
ipsa loquitor instructions in cases alleging negligence during surgery if some
harm is done to a part of the body that was not involved in the surgery. If a
surgeon "accidentally" amputates the wrong leg, "the thing speaks for itself."
Making res ipsa loquitor more available is likely to result in greater probability of
recovery for plaintiffs.
62. Qual, supra note 33, at 428-31.
63. CARLiN, MEDICAL MALPRACTCE PRE-TRiAL SCREENING PANELs: A REVIEw OF
THE EvimENcE (1980); Daughtrey & Smith, Medical Malpractice 'Review Panels'
in Operation in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 273 (1985).
64. Schor, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed
Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 Omo ST. J. ON DIsPuTE REso.
LUTION 65 (1988).
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costs and rewards for litigation.6 5 For example, some states tried to
limit frivolous cases by enacting legislation requiring the unsuccessful
party to pay attorney and expert witness fees. Other states passed
statutes that either set limits on the upper boundaries of attorney fees
or authorized the courts to do so. Because the collateral source rule66
was criticized for contributing to increased damage awards and
thereby increasing motivation to bring suit, some states enacted legis-
lation that allows the trier of fact to adjust awards according to the
availability to patients of alternative sources of compensation. Other
attempts at reducing the incentives for bringing suit included statutes
that placed monetary caps on the size of awards, created patient com-
pensation funds to pay plaintiffs' settlements in excess of established
caps, and permitted defendants to reimburse plaintiffs in installments
instead of lump sum payments.
Some states enacted creative insurance legislation to combat the
availability crisis.67 A majority of state legislatures allowed for the
establishment of non-profit joint underwriting associations (JUA) in
which money controlled by commercial liability insurers is pooled
within a state to form a self-sustaining fund that guarantees the avail-
ability of insurance at premium rates.68 If losses to the collective fund
occur, they are assessed against the member companies. A few states
have passed statutes authorizing the creation of insurance companies
owned and operated by physicians who presumably are inclined to
hold down premiums.
Finally, there are a series of reforms that were enacted to directly
alter the evidential and procedural aspects of tort doctrine. States ac-
ted to limit the availability of res ipsa loquitor. Some states raised the
standard of proof in medical malpractice cases to exceed that which is
normally required for res ipsa instructions. Other states enacted legis-
lation restricting which physicians may serve as expert witnesses,
thereby limiting the plaintiff's ability to give testimony about the cus-
tomary standard of care. Qualification limitations include requiring
the expert to have practiced in the defendant's specialty for a specified
percentage of years of the expert's professional life or to have prac-
ticed within the last calendar year. Other states codified some version
of the locality rule limiting the availability of expert testimony. An-
other reaction aimed at reducing the number of causes of action were
statutes that tightened the law of informed consent to limit or discour-
65. Qual, supra note 33.
66. "The collateral source rule prevents the value of any benefits received by the
injured party from sources other than the tortfeasor to offset the damage recov-
ery." Id. at 433.
67. Id.
68. Id. See also Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance 'Crisis' of the
1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'T & L. 629 (1985).
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age lack of patient consent claims. 6 9 Finally, some states eliminated
the ad damnum clause as part of the plaintiff's complaint. The clause
lists the amount of recovery that the victim seeks. State legislatures
concluded that listing in public documents the amount of recoveries
sought increased the incentives for potential plaintiffs.
It has been argued that the crisis of availability of the 1970's faded
away only to be replaced by the crisis affordability of the 1980'S.70
Although increased malpractice insurance premiums have not driven
insurers out of the 1980s' markets, they have made medical malprac-
tice insurance unaffordable for many doctors. Many of the tort re-
forms were held to be unconstitutional and it is doubtful that others
had the intended effect.
Even if the tort reforms of the 1970's had the intended effect of
limiting the frequency and size of malpractice suits and ultimately re-
ducing the growth of insurance premiums, they were inconsistent
with the four functions of tort law described at the beginning of this
manuscript. Limiting injured patients' access to the courts, creating
disincentives to litigation by redistributing costs and benefits of adju-
dication, and enacting legislation that turns the procedural and sub-
stantive law in favor of the defendant reduce the effectiveness of tort
in meeting the plaintiff's needs for retribution, compensation, and re-
69. The patient has the right to decide whether or not to undergo a medical proce-
dure. "[E]very competent adult [has a] right to forego treatment, or even cure, if
it entails what for him are intolerable consequences or risks however unwise his
sense of value may be in the eyes of the medical profession." Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972). Most jurisdictions evaluate the physi-
cian's responsibility according to a customary standard of care. See King, supra
note 11. If the doctor fails to inform the patient of some risk of injury that is
customarily revealed in the community of practicing physicians in similar circum-
stances and that injury results from the treatment, then the physician is negli-
gent and liable for the resulting harm. Most jurisdictions further require an
objective test such that a reasonable person would not have consented to the
treatment had that person been made aware of the risk of harm.
A minority of jurisdictions follow the materiality rule in deciding whether or
not withholding information about risk of harm may be negligent:
[A] physician owes to his patient the duty to disclose in a reasonable
manner all significant medical information that the physician possesses
or reasonably should possess that is material to an intelligent decision by
the patient whether to undergo a proposed procedure. The information
a physician reasonably should possess is that information possessed by
the average qualified physician.... What the physician should know
involves professional expertise and can ordinarily 'be proved only
through the testimony of experts.... However, the extent to which he
must share that information with his patient depends upon what infor-
mation he should reasonably recognize is material to the plaintiff's deci-
sion.... The materiality determination is one that lay persons are
qualified to make without the aid of an expert....
Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152,155-56,439 N.E.2d 240,
243 (1982).
70. Qual, supra note 33.
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ducing the prevalence of substandard care. In dealing with the crisis
of affordability, plaintiffs may fair better if the courts and legislatures
acknowledge the role of tort law as educator, and consider modifica-
tions in procedure and substance which are designed to provide norms
that will motivate physicians to adhere to a set of professional values
without reducing further the availability of retributive or compensa-
tory efficacy. From a psycholegal perspective the real need for reform
in the malpractice system is not to restrict plaintiffs from bringing suit
for valid causes of action, but is instead to clarify the law so that pa-
tients and physicians alike become more aware of what is required of
each and under what circumstances it is appropriate to bring suit. If
the standards of care are more explicit, physicians will be less likely to
breach them and patients will be less tempted to argue that simple
errors constitute malpractice. The end result ought to be a reduction
in the number of negligently caused iatrogenic injuries and the
number of unreasonable claims.
The next section provides an analysis of the impact of the reform
movement of the 1970's. It begins with a review of the empirical re-
search that brings into question the extent to which the reforms fully
achieved all intended effects. Next, the discussion turns to economic
theory to try and explain some of the reasons why the reforms may
have been less than completely successful. Finally, I discuss the need
for a psycholegal approach to the medical malpractice problem. The
goal of this approach is to establish medical standards of care to which
doctors adhere not because they are fearful to do otherwise, but be-
cause the standards describe a true consensus to which physicians will
owe a professional allegiance.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REFORMS
A. Empirical Analysis
Two recent and often cited empirical studies used data collected
during the medical malpractice crisis (mid 1970's) to try and isolate
predictors of insurance premiums claim frequency, 71 and claim sever-
ity.72 The first treated average premium levels and changes in average
premium levels as dependent variables in regression analyses in which
data was entered from all fifty states for the years 1974, 1975, 1976,
1977, and 1978.73 Each state, measured at a given year was a single
observation point.
A number of variables were entered to explain or control for ex-
isting premium levels as were a number of predictors to measure the
71. Sloan, supra note 68.
72. DANZON, supra note 5.
73. Sloan, supra note 68.
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influence of tort modifications of the 1970's, including alternatives to
trial and changes in tort doctrine and insurance provisions. The study
confirmed the trend showing that the premium changes increased
over the years. However, only one significant relationship with pre-
mium amount using the control variables was found. Premiums were
higher for general practitioners, ophthalmologists, and orthopedic sur-
geons in states with higher surgery rates. Especially interesting was
the lack of any relationship between the number of lawyers and pre-
mium rates. The study failed to find any support for the theory that
the medical malpractice crises were precipitated in part by an increase
in the number of practicing attorneys.
With regard to the predictor variables designed to distinguish
among states that enacted various tort reforms, few significant rela-
tionships were found at the conventional .05 level of significance. The
only tort reform that was consistently related to decreases in premium
rates was mandating pretrial screening panels to which cases have to
be submitted before going to trial. States with mandatory screening
panels had significantly lower insurance premiums as compared to
states without such panels. Perhaps of equal interest was the absence
of other associations, which indicates that the various tort reforms of
the 1970's had little significant impact on decreasing insurance
premiums.74
A somewhat similar study75 also treated states as observation
points but included data from 1975 to 1984 and employed as dependent
variables claim frequency and average severity of paid claims per 100
doctors in each state.7 6 Like the earlier research, this study used a
form of regression analysis to examine the relationship between the
dependent variables and some control or explanatory predictors and
some variables coded to measure whether a state had adopted a partic-
ular tort reform. Significant increases were found over time for claim
frequency and claim severity per physician. The medical malpractice
crisis appears to have continued in some form at least well into the
mid 1980's.
Some of the more consistent relationships between the tort re-
74. The other tort reforms examined in Sloan's analysis were:
1) limiting provider payments to plaintiffs, 2) limiting use of res ipsa lo-
quitor doctrine, 3) tightening the statute of limitations, 4) clarifying in-
formed consent, 5) imposing contingent-fee regulation, 6) adding
collateral-source provisions, 7) eliminating the ad damnum clause, 8) im-
posing a locality rule, 9) allowing for binding arbitration, 10) creatingjoint underwriting associations, and 11) allowing formation of health
care mutual insurance companies.
Id. at 633-637. Sloan found no evidence that any of these reforms had any impact
on insurance premiums.
75. DANzON, supra note 5.
76. Although Danzon used some additional dependent measures they are not dis-
cussed because they are less central to the purposes of this article.
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forms and claim frequency involved statutes of limitations and collat-
eral benefits. Shorter statutes of limitations and collateral source
offset were significantly related to reductions in the frequency of total
and paid claims. Pretrial screening had no relationship with either
measure of claim frequency and binding arbitration boards seemed to
be related to increases in claim frequency, especially small claim fre-
quency, suggesting arbitration may provide an opportunity for small
claim plaintiffs to have their grievances heard. With regard to claim
severity, some of the tort reforms also appear to be related to lower
compensatory damages. In particular, caps on awards, collateral
source offset, and voluntary binding arbitration are related to lower
paid claims.
Viewed together the results of these two studies suggest some in-
teresting possibilities. First, both studies suggest that increases in in-
surance premiums, malpractice claim frequency, and malpractice
claim severity show no sign of abating. Second, the first study found
that reform of tort doctrine had very little relationship with the size of
insurance premiums. Nonetheless, the second study indicates that
some of the reforms were related to reductions in the frequency and
severity of malpractice claims. Together these results would suggest
that although the tort reforms of the 1970's were related to decreases
in frequency and size of claims, the reductions were not translated
into similar cut backs in the costs of insurance to physicians. Thus,
even though some of the tort reforms may have acted to decrease re-
wards for iatrogenic injuries, there is little evidence that the reduc-
tions in rewards were realized by either physicians or patients with
regard to the costs of insurance and ultimately medical care.
The fact that the tort reforms were associated with lower claim
frequency and severity but not with lower premiums suggests that
premiums are somewhat insensitive to changes in claim frequency and
severity. Given that recent data estimates that median premiums rep-
resent less than three-percent of gross practice income for physicians 77
and the apparently weak relationship between tort reforms and aver-
age insurance premiums, it is unlikely that physician negligence is de-
termined solely by expected malpractice costs. The link between
insurance premiums and physician behavior may not be strong enough
to invoke the full force of market economics to regulate medical mal-
practice. For a fuller explanation of the weak link between expected
malpractice costs and negligence it is necessary to examine some of
the theoretical positions made by the law and economics movement.
77. Kirchner, Is Your Practice Begging for Money, MED. ECON. 214 (Nov. 12, 1984).
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B. Economic Analysis
Perhaps, the most central concept in the positive economic theory
of tort law is the Pareto superiority sense of efficiency:
[A] policy change is said to be efficient if the winners from the change could
compensate the losers, that is, if the winners gain more from the change than
the losers lose, whether or not there is actual compensation.... A change is
wealth maximizing if the dollar value of the gains to the winners is greater
than the dollar cost of the losses to the losers. The positive economic theory of
tort law holds that tort rules are efficient in the sense of wealth
maximiyzing.7 8
Landes and Posner argue that judicial decisions and rules of tort law
are efficient if they maximize wealth, and that the unstated goal of
tort litigation is efficiency. Thus, if the expected disutility of injury is
a greater cost to the plaintiff than is the expected utility of the costs of
adequate precautions for the defendant, then the efficient decision
goes to the plaintiff.
According to the Coase theorem,79 if transaction and bargaining
costs are low, the parties in a tort situation will bargain to an economi-
cally efficient solution regardless of the how the law assigns rights.
For example, if the law favored physicians in cases of malpractice, pa-
tients would offer - bribe - their doctors with enough financial com-
pensation to avoid the acts of harm up to the amount that the victims
expected to lose from the occurrence of the harmful act. Patients
would offer bribes of sufficient value to lower the expected disutility
to an acceptable level. On the other hand, if the law favored patients,
the doctors would take precautions to avoid the harm until the cost of
the precautions exceeded the expected costs of injury to the patient.
At the point at which cost of the precautions exceeded the potential
loss to the patient, and through recovery loss to the physician, it would
no longer be rational for the physician to assume the precautionary
costs. In either scenario the resulting interaction would maximize
wealth in the sense that the parties would negotiate the level of risk
that was acceptable to themselves.
If transaction costs were low, the tort system would be effective in
primary cost reduction (ie., reducing the number and severity of acci-
dents) even if third parties were held liable for injuries as long as full
compensation was required.0 Consider the situation of insurance
firms in medical malpractice suits. If the insurers are required to pay
the costs of the injuries caused by the physicians, they would act as
agents of the patients to bribe the physicians to alter their risky con-
duct by increasing rates for violations of the standard of care and re-
ducing rates for adherence to the standard. They would do so up to
78. LANDES & POSNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
79. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
80. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis (1970).
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the point where the bribes exceeded the expected costs of injury that
the insurance companies were required to pay the injured. The in-
volvement of third parties points out clearly that the goal of efficient
tort action is not necessarily to deter harmful conduct but instead to
balance or optimize unnecessary precautions against harmful profes-
sional conduct.S1
Assuming that the logic derived from the Coase theorem is correct
the outcome it predicts has two serious problems. First, the Coase the-
orem may work well in the closed system for which it was developed,
but it has serious limitations when applied in the open systems of the
real world.8 2 The theory does not take into account the fact that the
results of bargaining with or without judicial intervention favor those
who enter the negotiations with superior financial and informational
resources. Instead it assumes that all actors enter the system with an
equal ability to bargain. For example, if the law, for purposes of effi-
ciency, holds in favor of a physician practicing in obstetrics and gyne-
cology who fails to order a medical test because the cost of ordering
the test far exceeds the expected cost of stillbirth (presumably be-
cause the probability of stillbirth without the procedure is very low), it
is unlikely that future plaintiffs will be able to band together and pay
the transaction costs that would be necessary to modify the behavior
of physicians to perform the extra procedures. Patients have neither
the resources nor the information (e.g., explicit knowledge of stan-
dards of care) required to make the necessary bribes available to phy-
sicians. In a sense, the inability of patients to modify the behavior of
physicians fails to promote efficiency because the expected loss may
exceed the resources that patients have available to meet the level of
bribes necessary to purchase the needed precautions.
A second serious problem that is more germane to the issues dis-
cussed in this manuscript is the nature of the feedback loop between
insurance companies and physicians. In order to bargain effectively
either within or outside the judicial system, patients, physicians, and
attorneys need to have a clear expectation about the medical standard
of care. Without being able to refer explicitly to the requirements of
standard medical treatment patients are unable to determine whether
or not an injury is due to an honest failure in medical knowledge and
technology, or if it is due to physician negligence. Physicians and in-
surance companies are equally unprepared to attribute responsibility
to the rightful source of the injury. Under such conditions of uncer-
tainty the most effective strategy for the insurance company and phy-
sician might be to assume that iatrogenic injuries are negligent and to
protect themselves from potential loss. As a result insurance compa-
81. LANsEs & PosNER, supra note 78.
82. Donohue, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 LAw & Soc'y REv. 903
(1985).
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nies are unable to tie premiums directly to the implicit standards of
care that underlie negligence law and are unable to bargain effectively
with physicians. The only cautious strategy available is to increase in-
surance premiums to cover the uncertainties that are an inherent part
of the implicit standards of care. Thus, even if tort reform has brought
about a reduction in the frequency and severity of causes of action, the
unpredictable nature of medical standards of care make it difficult for
insurance companies to translate these outcomes into appropriate
changes in insurance premiums. It would seem that patients and phy-
sicians need to have clear expectations about the medical standard of
care, if they are to bargain effectively through the courts or outside
the courts. Thus a marketplace analysis of medical malpractice law
relies on patients' and doctors' knowledge of the standard of care. It
would appear that making that standard explicit in areas that witness
a large number of suits would sharpen the market mechanisms that
are at work and would allow society to hold patients, physicians, and
insurance companies accountable for their roles in the medical mal-
practice crisis.
C. Psycholegal Analysis
The law and social science movement and in particular the law and
psychology perspective holds that the law acts to modify behavior by
announcing the social norms of society.8 3 The social norms of society
are no less controlling of professional conduct than they are of the
behavior of any other category of people. The law acts to educate the
members of a social group and of society as a whole about the underly-
ing value system that gives rise to expectations of social behavior. The
minds of people are not blank computation machines, but instead con-
tain encoded representations of all the experience that has come
before in the lives of individuals. It is well established that the spe-
cific content of individuals' memory structures guide their behavior.
The cognitive structures of individuals have been studied extensively
by psychologists.84
There are a number of areas in which scientists have found that
social judgments and decision making are determined by the way in
which people represent in their memories information collected in the
outside world. Some recent research demonstrates that conduct is an
expression of internalized cognitive structures in juror verdicts,85 judi-
83. Melton & Saks, supra note 8.
84. See FISKE & TAYLOR, SoCIAL COGNrTION (1984).
85. Casper, Kennette, & Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes and Decision-Making in Search
and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 93 (1988); Pennington & Has-
tie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PsYcHoLOGy 242 (1986); Wiener, Wiener, & Grisso, Empathy and Biased Assimi-
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cial decisions,86 political behavior,8 7 and general impression forna-
tion.88 Although there is some disagreement about the manner in
which information is stored, manipulated, and retrieved, there is wide-
spread agreement that the simple content of cognitive structures have
a profound impact on conduct. There is also widespread agreement
that the human mind is not a purely rational processor of information.
People search for short cuts or heuristics in making judgments and
decisions.89 It is these considerations that have lead social psycholo-
gists to view people more as "cognitive misers" than as "intuitive
scientists."9o
Psycholegal jurisprudence suggests that law, including medical
malpractice law, has its greatest impact as an educator. It is the sym-
bolic content of law and its representation in the minds of people that
most influences behavior. Social science and law scholars, in part,
view the "law as an institution that reifies our sense of commu-
nity.. . ."91 Law provides a system of behavioral cues directing con-
duct in ways that are acceptable to society at large as well as to specific
subgroups:
[Tihe nature of law, apart from its underlying ideology, is such that a primary
function is to provide cues for behavior the society approves of, or at least to
provide inhibiting cues to suppress the behavior the society disapproves of....
A legal decision not only resolves a particular dispute, it also offers informa-
tion about state approved behavior.
9 2
Medical malpractice law should strive to inform both physicians
and patients about the standard of care that it prescribes for health
providers. It should reflect the standards of the profession in a way
that allows patients, physicians, and jurors to measure those standards
against the general values of the community. Making the standard of
care explicit and defending it as a legitimate set of prescriptions may
lation of Testimonies in Cases of Alleged Rape, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 343
(1989).
86. Higgins & Stangor, A 'C7ange-of-Standard' Perspective on the Relations Among
Context Judgmen4 and Memory, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 181
(1988); Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of
Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING,
MEMORY, AND COGNITION 521 (1988).
87. Fazio & Williams, Attitude Accessibility as a Moderator of the Attitude-Percep-
tion and Attitude-Behavior Relations: An Investigation of the 1984 Presidential
Election, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 505 (1986).
88. See generally Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation, 1 AD-
VANCES IN SOC. COGNITION 1 (1988).
89. See generally KAHNEMAN, SLOvic, & TvERsKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Sherman & Corty, Cognitive Heuristics, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 189 (1984).
90. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 84.
91. Melton, Law, Science, and Humanity: Reflections on the Defeat of Judge Bork,
LAw & HuM. BEHAV. (in press).
92. Melton & Saks, supra note 8, at 257.
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be as effective in the general deterrence of substandard treatment as
relying on the motivating forces of expected utility.
Viewing iatrogenic injury and resulting medical malpractice claims
in the language of the literature of psychology and decision making,
one might first draw a distinction between injury that is due to negli-
gence and injury that is the result of a failure of medical knowledge
and technology (or a chance event). A second distinction should be
made between iatrogenic injury that results in a cause of action and
injury that does not lead to use of the legal system to make a claim of
negligence. The first distinction holds information about the etiology
of the injury and the second about the decision whether or not to
make use of the legal system. If we are focusing on the occurrence of
negligent harm, then the plaintiff's decision to pursue a law suit after
being harmed by the actual negligence of a physician would be la-
belled a true positive and the decision not to pursue a suit under condi-
tions of non-negligent iatrogenic harm is a true negative. The positive
versus negative distinction is reserved for the decision dimension (ie.,
whether or not to bring a negligence claim) and the true versus false
distinction is used for the corresponding veridicality between the pa-
tient's decision and the etiological dimension. Thus, a decision to file a
claim when the cause of harm is simply the failure of medical knowl-
edge and technology (or the result of a chance event) is a false positive
(a type I error), and the decision to not file a claim under conditions
where there is medical negligence is a false negative (a type II error).
Tort law should act to maximize both true positives and true nega-
tives. In other words it should encourage decisions to use the legal
system under conditions where there is actual negligence and deci-
sions to avoid its use under conditions of no actual negligence. At the
same time tort law should discourage false positives and false nega-
tives, making claims under conditions of no negligence and failing to
use the medical malpractice system under conditions of actual negli-
gence. Further, the tort system should act to decrease the incidence of
actual medical negligence regardless of whether or not suits are filed.
The medical malpractice reforms of the 1970's failed to discriminate
between false positives and true positives. The reforms were attempts
to reduce medical malpractice claims without systematic concern for
the etiological dimension of iatrogenic injury. The reforms, if any-
thing, encouraged false negatives - the failure to use the medical mal-
practice system for actual negligent injuries.
The objectives of psycholegal jurisprudence with respect to medi-
cal malpractice law are the normative goals of tort law discussed
above. The attainment of the objectives can most directly be realized
by making explicit medical standards of care so that physicians, pa-
tients, lawyers, jurors, and judges are able to draw meaningful distinc-
tions between the etiological antecedents. One can not reliably
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determine whether behavior is negligent unless the standards by
which the behavior is to be judged are made explicit.
V. AN EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF MEDICAL STANDARDS
OF CARE
A. Customary Versus Accepted Medical Standards of Care
Two central assumptions that were incorporated into the early
medical standard of care were: 1) the law adopted custom as a measure
of the duty owed to a patient by a physician even though in other areas
of negligence the law applied the reasonably prudent person standard;
and 2) custom exists with regard to all medical procedures without
which there would be no method available for questioning the conduct
of a physician.9 3 Any method that purports to measure the standard
of care must be based on some definition of the normative practices of
professionals.
However, there are some good reasons to consider replacing the
customary standard with a version of the reasonably prudent person
standard.94 The customary standard is rooted in habit. The control-
ling duty is defined strictly in terms of those procedures that have
been performed with sufficient regularity so as to become the founda-
tion of current practices. It is not a certainty that medical custom is
sensitive enough to technological changes nor insensitive enough to
market pressures to produce optimal health care.
A well known example of the distinction between the reasonably
prudent person standard and the customary standard, which also illus-
trates the insensitivity of the customary standard to technological ad-
vancement, comes from a case decided by the renowned Judge
Learned Hand. In The TJ. Hooper,9 5 Judge Hand ruled that the
Northern Barge Company, owner of the tugs, Montrose and Hooper,
was liable for damages due to the loss of two barges being pulled by
the tugs in a storm off the New Jersey coast. If proper radio equip-
ment had been available the tugs would have been warned of the im-
minent storm and would have been able to reach safe harbor. Judge
Hand ruled against the owners of the tugs even though it was custom-
ary in 1932 for tugs not to carry radio receivers arguing that custom is
not probative in cases of ordinary negligence and that given the state
of the art in radio transmissions a reasonably prudent tug boat owner
would have provided adequate radio equipment. Thus, Judge Hand
distinguished between customary and accepted standards as they ap-
ply to ordinary duty and ruled that evidence of customary practices
was not dispositive in establishing ordinary care.
93. Keeton, supra note 9.
94. King, supra note 11.
95. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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It has been suggested that the customary standard should be re-
placed with the accepted practice standard in medical malpractice
law.96 Such a standard based on the "practices approved by the profes-
sion, not necessarily those customarily followed by its members," has
three distinct advantages. First, because the accepted standard is
based on the best practices of the day, it would announce that novel
techniques not rooted in customary practice are nonetheless subject to
malpractice litigation. Thus the professional standard would consider
the physicians' reasonable expectations of the need for up to date care.
Second, it would not suffice for physicians to conform their conduct to
that which was approved by others who were engaged in the same ac-
tivities. Instead, they would be required to conduct their practices ac-
cording to the best judgments of the day, based on current medical
technology. Third, the accepted practice standard would probably be
less burdened by a possible lack of consensus. The standard would be
based on the ideal judgment of practitioners in similar situations;
therefore, there would be much less room for disagreement than there
is about the customary standard, which is more strongly influenced by
the individual differences in habits of practicing physicians.
Although there has been some discussion of the logic of the ac-
cepted practice standard, there has been little acceptance of the con-
clusions. One outstanding exception is found in Helling v. Carey.97
The plaintiff, Barbara Helling, regularly consulted with two ophthal-
mologists for nearsightedness and as a result she was fitted with con-
tact lenses in 1959. Although Helling complained of additional visual
problems, the defendants considered them to be related solely to diffi-
culties she was having with her contact lenses. In October of 1968 one
of the defendants conducted a test for glaucoma and found that the
plaintiff suffered from the disease. As a result of the disease, Helling
essentially lost her peripheral vision and experienced a dramatic re-
duction in her central vision. The defendants produced expert wit-
nesses to testify that the customary standard of care was not to
administer the pressure test routinely to patients under age forty be-
cause the incidence of glaucoma was extremely low in that age group.
Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court finding for Helling, sup-
ported an accepted standard rule over the customary standard. The
court reasoned that because the pressure test was harmless and inex-
pensive, it was the duty of the ophthalmologist to administer the pro-
cedure routinely to all patients. In short, the court fashioned its own
accepted practice standard and replaced the customary care standard
with its own test.
In Harris v. Groth,98 the Washington Supreme Court interpreted
96. King, supra note 11, at 1236.
97. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
98. 99 Wash. 2d 438, 663 P.2d 113 (1983).
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the Washington statute as follows:
The standard of care against which a health care provider's conduct is to be
measured is that of a reasonably prudent practitioner possessing the degree of
skill, care, and learning possessed by other members of the same profession in
the state of Washington. The degree of care actually practiced by members of
the profession is only some evidence of what is reasonably prudent - it is not
dispositive.9 9
Psycholegal jurisprudence favors a standard of care which is reflec-
tive of the current practice among physicians. The standard should
reflect the norms of the culture of practicing doctors. However, if the
standard is to distinguish between injury due to negligence and injury
due to failure of medical knowledge and technology, then the standard
should not ignore the difference between customary and normative
practices. A process that empirically defines medical standards should
encourage doctors to exercise that degree of care which is acceptable
given the best available technology of the time. It is important not
only to construct a standard which makes current practice explicit,
but also a rule that motivates physicians to establish patterns of care
that incorporate the most current medical advancements. For these
reasons the scaling technique advocated below is described for estab-
lishing both customary and accepted practice standards. Although the
purpose of this manuscript is not to suggest alterations in the doctrine
of medical malpractice law, it nonetheless is reasonable to point out
that from the perspective of sound decision making the decision
maker should be aware of the differences between customary and nor-
mative standards. Thus, an objective fact finder in any malpractice
case should consider both standards before deciding on liability.
B. Applied Decision Theory and Medical Standards of Care
The decision aid advocated here borrows heavily from existing psy-
chological approaches to the study of human judgment and decision
making. Procedures for improving the quality of human decision
making are well documented in research literature on cognitive and
social psychology. 00 Techniques for applied decision analysis vary
from informal suggestions such as cognitive debiasing,O1 to formal
probabilistic reasoning models,O2 and to multivariate policy captur-
ing.103 The approach advocated here was employed to translate part
99. Id. at 445, 663 P.2d at 120.
100. Hammond, Rohrbaugh, Mumpower, & Adelman, Social Judgment Theory: Appli-
cations in Policy Formation, in HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES IN
APPLIED SETINGS (1977).
101. Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(1982).
102. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportuni-
ties, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
103. Hammond, Rohrbaugh, Mumpower, & Adelman, supra note 100.
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of the desegregation order of the District Court of Missouri into a deci-
sion guideline for evaluating magnet schools.104
The issue in medical malpractice suits is to identify the underlying
dimension of care in dispute, and to provide a continuum of treatment
procedures from which a legally valid sample of physicians may make
judgments about the adequacy of treatment for a specific health
threatening circumstance. It is clear from existing law that these
judgments must represent the customary treatment of the appropriate
community of professionals. It is not sufficient for the standard to re-
flect simply what one or two doctors would recommend in a given cir-
cumstance. Instead, the standard of care must document those
"services in.... the practice of a profession" that are required by phy-
sicians in order to "exercise the skill and knowledge normally pos-
sessed by members of that profession."105 While the courts have
traditionally relied on expert testimony of physicians to establish the
standard of care, another approach is to ask a sample of doctors to
evaluate hypothetical cases closely modelled after the case at bar.
This approach would establish rational utility functions describing
the probability that the physicians would prescribe each of the alter-
native treatments which vary along the health care dimension under
dispute. The proposal combines aspects of two prescriptive models,
Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT)106 and Simple Multiattribute
Rating Technique (SMART).107 The methodology is tailored to ex-
plicitly map out the implicit rules that physicians would follow as they
decide upon the appropriate treatment plans for specific medical
problems. The end product of this measurement process is a descrip-
tive account of the standard of care for a specific medical circumstance
as practiced by a community of doctors.
The model includes five steps: 1) identify the legally relevant group
of professionals; 2) identify from the case at bar the attribute(s) of
health care in dispute; 3) solicit from some subset of physicians alter-
native plans of treatment that vary along the dimension of care; 4)
determine from each physician in the sample a separate utility func-
tion that describes the likelihood that he or she (or a reasonably pru-
dent physician) would prescribe each of the treatment plans in a
situation similar to the case at bar; and 5) aggregate the individual util-
ity functions to establish customary and accepted practice norms for
104. Wiener, Frank, & Libros, Termination Guidelines for a Magnet School Review
Committee: Applicution of Decision Theory, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL)GY: RES. & PRAC.
316 (1988).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 229(A)(1965).
106. EDWARDS & NEwVAN, MULTIVARIATE EVALUATION (1982); KEENEY & RAIFFA,
DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS
(1976); Prrz & MCKILLIP, DECISION ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATORS (1984).
107. Gardiner & Edwards, in Public Values: Multi-Attribute-Utiliti Measurementfor
Social Decision Making, in HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES (1975).
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the situation in dispute. After describing a recent malpractice suit,
Soileau v. HCA Health Service, Inc.,108 I will describe how the scaling
technique could be applied to the dispute in that case.
In Soileau the plaintiff, a chronic alcoholic and abuser of antip-
sychotic and antidepressant medications, had been diagnosed schizo-
phrenic long before he voluntarily committed himself into a treatment
program at Cypress Hospital. The treatment program, modeled after
the Hazelton/Johnston Program, consisted of three phases of treat-
ment, 1) detoxification, 2) education, and 3) recovery and follow-up.
At the time he was admitted, a nurse who took a medical history of
the plaintiff described him as calm and alert. The physician in charge
of the case, Dr. Bernard, was a general family practitioner who testi-
fied that he was unaware of the fact that the plaintiff was schizo-
phrenic. Bernard claimed that although the plaintiff admitted taking
several prescribed drugs to control psychotic behavior, the plaintiff
showed no signs of schizophrenia nor did he admit to the disease. Dur-
ing the initial stage of treatment Bernard discontinued all of the plain-
tiff's medications and prescribed Serax to ease the detoxification.
Subsequently, the plaintiff suffered a psychotic break, becoming para-
noid with delusions that he was God. The plaintiff was treated with
medication and brought to a psychiatric ward where he stayed for sev-
enteen days. The plaintiff sued Bernard and the Cypress Hospital for
gross neglect.
The plaintiff proffered two psychiatrists who testified that they
would not have abruptly removed the plaintiff from his antipsychotic
medicine. Both experts questioned the soundness of Bernard's judg-
ment in discontinuing the drugs based only on the plaintiff's self-re-
ported medical history without first consulting Soileau's previous
physicians. The trial court held, and the appellate court affirmed, that
the experts' professional opinions had not gone far enough to establish
the duty owed to the plaintiff: "[N]either doctor testified as to the
standard of care exercised by a physician practicing in a clinic offering
therapy modeled after the Hazelton/Johnston Program."109 Thus, the
court found in favor of the defendant holding that the plaintiff had not
established a prima facie case of professional negligence.
1. Identify the Legally Relevant Group of Professionals
It would appear that the court was not satisfied with the plaintiff's
evidence, in part because the experts were only willing to provide
their own prescriptions, but were not willing to identify with certainty
the customary standard of care. Perhaps there is another approach to
108. 539 So.2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
109. Id. at 665. The drugs included Etraphene Forte, Tranxene, Stelazine, and
Thorazine.
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establishing the standard that would not be frustrated by the expert's
unwillingness to establish customary norms. The first step is to select
a legally valid sample of physicians to evaluate possible treatment
plans. If a legally valid sample of physicians (i.e. a sample that satis-
fies the jurisdiction's requirements for locality, specialty status, and
knowledge qualifications) expressed the same opinion as did the ex-
perts in Soileau that "they would not have removed the plaintiff so
abruptly from his antipsychotic medicine,""10 but rather would have
consulted first with the patient's prior physicians, it would be a legiti-
mate inference within the "common knowledge" of the jury to con-
clude that the opinions of that representative sample of physicians
define the customary standard of care.
In Louisiana, a "similar locality rule" jurisdiction, empirical data
defining the medical standard of care would only include responses
collected from physicians who were familiar with the standard of care
in the defendant's community or similar communities under similar
conditions. It also appears that the experts must testify to the "degree
of care ordinarily exercised and the degree of skill or knowledge ordi-
narily possessed by physicians within the involved specialty.""' Thus
a legally valid sample of respondents should only include family prac-
titioners and psychiatrists who practice in cities similar in size, urban-
ization, and available medical technology to Baton Rouge Louisiana,
the city in which Cypress Hospital is located.
As the discussion in the early sections of this manuscript points
out, the selection of an appropriate sample is a criti6al issue for any
procedure attempting to give an empirical definition to medical stan-
dards of care. Data from a sample of respondents that do not satisfy
the expert witness criteria of a particular jurisdiction may very well be
ruled inadmissible in that jurisdiction. Researchers should carefully
select a representative sample of respondents from a legally valid pop-
ulation of physicians.
Samples are most representative to the extent that they are ran-
domly selected from a known population. There are many methods of
random selection available and most are discussed in detail in elemen-
tary research design textbooks. Most of these techniques require se-
lection by a random number process that identifies potential
respondents from a known universe. One approach might be to use a
random number table to select some percentage of all physicians of a
particular specialty in some well defined geographic area. Lists of ad-
dresses and phone numbers of area physicians are available at a small
cost from state medical associations. The lists are aggregated accord-
ing to area and specialty.
110. Id. at 665.
Mn. Id. at 664.
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It is worthwhile to note that a potentially serious problem in repre-
sentative sampling using physician respondents is bias that might be
created by nonresponders. One can only speculate about differences
between physicians who do or do not elect to respond to requests for
interviews or requests to complete questionnaire materials. Perhaps
the physicians with the most amount of available time and who are
most likely to respond are doctors seeing the fewest patients. One
reason that they see fewer patients may be because they are not as
well trained as those who have larger practices. If this assumption
were an accurate description of reality, then responders to research
requests might very well be more representative of less well trained
professionals.
On the other hand, it may be that the more conscientious physi-
cians, the ones who keep up with current developments, are more
likely to respond to research requests. Under this assumption re-
sponders would over represent the better trained physicians. Other
biases are also possible. Perhaps academicians are more likely to re-
spond to research requests than are physicians in private practice, pre-
sumably because the former are more interested in the research
process while the latter are more apt to limit their professional activ-
ity to treating patients. In any event, a data collection process that
results in a high percentage of nonresponders is suspect to systematic
biases that may limit its representativeness.
It is because of the above stated reasons that researchers sampling
physician respondents should try to select a small list of representa-
tives of a legally valid population and make every possible effort to
obtain a response from each member on the list. Smaller randomly
selected samples (in this case perhaps twenty to thirty physicians)
with few nonresponders are more representative than larger samples
in which the random selection is compromised by a large number of
nonresponders. Although the methodology advocated here could po-
tentially be completed through the mail or over the telephone, arrang-
ing in-person interviews of approximately one hour in length provides
the researcher the opportunity to make concentrated efforts to reach
each and every respondent. Respondents are more likely to give their
complete attention to the task if it is part of an interview. Therefore,
there will be fewer uncompleted surveys discarded by hurried doctors.
Further, it is possible to examine potential biases in response patterns
by making multiple efforts at interviewing the potential responders.
The researcher may compare first contact responders with second and
multiple contact responders. The assumption is that multiple contact
responders would not have responded had there not been a concen-
trated effort to obtain their compliance. Therefore, the latter re-
sponders more closely resemble the nonresponders than do the first
contact responders. Any differences found between the first contact
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responders and the multiple contact responders are likely to reflect
differences between the responders and nonresponders. The absence
of differences may be used as evidence that the responders are not
different than the nonresponders.
Another approach to measuring bias is to compare demographic
information collected from the responders to any published
demographics of the members of the state medical association. If the
demographics of the responders are similar to the demographics of the
medical association, it is evidence that the data collected defining med-
ical standards of care is representative of responses that might have
been collected from the full roster of medical association members.
2. Identify the Attribute of Health Care in Dispute
In any given malpractice case there may be a variety of dimensions
of care that are contested or there may only be a single dimension.
The dimensions may require separate scaling, or they may be com-
bined into complex aggregates each representing different potential
treatment plans. The second step in the model is to analyze the situa-
tion in question and determine the specific dimension or dimensions of
treatment that are in dispute. Each dimension should consist of at
least two different values or treatment options between which the
sample of physicians must select a course of action. In Soileau, there
were 3 specific dimensions of health care in dispute. The first dimen-
sion had two options; the second dimension had three options; and the
third dimension had two options. These dimensions are:
A. Consulting with other doctors - (1) whether the defend-
ant should have relied solely on the plaintiff's self reported
history or (2) whether he should have consulted prior doctors
before deciding to discontinue the medications.
B. Reducing medications - (1) whether defendant should
have discontinued all the medications at once, or (2) should
have systematically removed the drugs one at a time to mea-
sure their effects, or (3) should have maintained the plaintiff
only on those drugs that he believed were needed to control
the patient's mental problems.
C. Prescribing Serax - (1) whether or (2) not Serax should
have been prescribed in a tapering fashion.
Identifying the attributes at issue in any decision analysis is ex-
ceedingly important for the remaining steps in the analysis. For medi-
cal malpractice complaints close consultation with some subset of
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experts is crucial if the dimensions sampled are to be sufficient.=2
This subset of experts should constitute a legally valid sample but
should not include any phygicians who will be asked to complete the
decision analytic task used to define the specific standard of care.
3. Identify Alternative Treatment Plans
The third step in the model requires the researcher to construct
alternative treatment plans by combining into separate collections the
options that make up each dimension with the options that make up
other dimensions. Crossing all dimensions in Soileau results in possi-
ble treatment plans. These plans range from: (1) the current physi-
cian consults with the patient's previous doctor and learns that the
patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physician systematically
removes the prescribed medications, one at a time, leading ultimately
to discontinuation of all unnecessary dr ugs. For the purpose of easing
the detoxification process the doctor prescribes Serax in tapered dos-
ages; to (12) the current physician does not consult with the patient's
previous doctor. The physician discontinues all prescribed medica-
tions. No additional medications are prescribed. Between the ex-
tremes are other combinations listed in Table 1.
4. Determine Separate Utility Functions
The fourth step requires each of the respondents in the sample to
evaluate the probability that he or she would follow each of the treat-
ment plans in the case at bar. Each participant is presented with a
description of the pleadings complete with all information necessary
to evaluate the appropriateness of each of the alternative treatment
plans. In Soileau this would include most of the details described
above with the exception of information about the specific treatment
plans. Next, the analyst would present in a random order all of the
treatment alternatives and ask the respondent to order them from the
least likely to meet the needs of the patient to the most likely. It is
important that the treatment plans be presented in different random
orders to avoid systematic carry over effects of one treatment plan
upon another. If the treatment plans are presented in random order
and each order is different for each respondent, any carry over effects
will be different for each physician. The errors introduced by the re-
peated presentation of treatment plans will balance out across
respondents.
The treatment plans would be assigned numbers and placed on the
abscissa of a graph upon which the ordinate was marked off in
112. This and all other technical medical questions that appear in this paper were de-
cided in close consultation with a resident psychiatrist, Dr. Tracy Ware, at St.
Louis University Medical Center.
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probability units ranging from 0 to 1.00. The respondent, with the
help of the analyst, would reorganize the treatment -plans on the ab-
scissa in order of the likelihood that the plans will meet the patient's
needs. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical utility function for the Soileau
case. Note that the alternatives arranged on the abscissa are ordered
from the least conservative treatment plan to the most conservative.
The respondent would be asked to identify the treatment plan that
he or she would be least likely to prescribe for a patient under circum-
stances similar to those presented in the scenario, and the one that he
or she would be most likely to prescribe. Note that the treatment
plan that is most conservative may provide more care than is needed.
Therefore that plan will not necessarily be the one most likely pre-
scribed. (See CRX in Figure 1.) First, for the treatment plan least
likely to be prescribed, the doctor would be asked, "On a scale ranging
from .00 to 1.00, what is the probability that you would treat the pa-
tient in this manner, given the circumstances described in the accom-
panying scenario." The respondent would next be asked to answer
this question for the most favorable plan and then for all the plans in
between. As the physician evaluated each plan his response would be
recorded on the graph so that she or he could make any corrections
necessary.
In this manner a complete utility function would be'established for
each of the alternative plans evaluated by the doctor. For example, a
hypothetical respondent in Soileau might have responded that the
probability of discounting all medications based on only the patient's
history and not prescribing Serax to ease the detoxification process
was only .15. However, the probability of consulting with the patient's
prior physician and then only removing in a systematic order, the un-
necessary antipsychotic medications while accompanying the detoxifi-
cation with a prescription of tapered Serax was evaluated at .60. This
information could be obtained by carefully examining that physician's
utility function.
To check the respondent's answers, the decision analyst might
make sure that the doctor believed that he or she would really be
twice as likely to follow a treatment alternative rated, at say .50, as
compared to one rated at .25. For example, if Figure 1 represented a
single utility function collected from only one doctor, that doctor
might be asked to confirm that he or she would be twice as likely to
follow the plan "HRX" as the alternative "HSX". Adjustments to the
utility function could be made to assure that the physician had re-
corded answers exactly as he or she believed them to be.
After the physician finished the ratings defining that physician's
utility function for standard care as it is defined by customary practice,
one could ask the doctor to repeat the process, but this time answering
a question written to elicit evaluations of accepted care rather than
1990]
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customary care. Rather than asking for the physician's own utility
function, the analyst might ask for ratings portraying how the reason-
ably prudent physician ought to prescribe treatments. The question
posed to the respondent for each treatment alternative might read
"On a scale ranging from .00 to 1.00, what is the probability that the
reasonably prudent physician would treat the patient in this manner,
given the circumstances described in the accompanying scenario." For
the purposes of this question the reasonably prudent physician would
be defined as one who was trained and well versed in all of the most
recent medical technologies available, and who was practicing under
normal conditions of temporal, physical, and economic constraints. In
order to assure an answer that does not reflect merely a self descrip-
tion, it would probably be necessary to allow the respondent some
time to research the problem to come up with a state of the art re-
sponse. To avoid response biases it may be prudent to sample separate
sets of doctors for the purposes of measuring the customary and ac-
cepted practice standard.
5. Aggregate Utility Functions to Develop Norms
Separately for each question (i.e., the customary standard and the
accepted standard questions), the utility functions for each alternative
treatment should be averaged across all respondents. Accompanying
each mean for each treatment alternative would be the variance, stan-
dard deviation, and perhaps confidence interval for that alternative. If
a customary standard of care actually exists with regard to the case
under investigation it would be evidenced by a peaked average
probability greater than .50, indicating that the average respondent
would be more likely than not to choose this procedure and with a
relatively small standard deviation, indicating a wide range of agree-
ment among physicians. Figure 1 displays the aggregated utility func-
tions for the hypothetical sample of Soileau respondents. It would
appear from the figure that the customary standard of care in this or a
similar situation is to maintain the patient on the necessary medica-
tions only after consulting with the patient's previous physicians and
to stabilize the patient on a tapering prescription of Serax (CMX -
hypothetical mean probability of .52 with a standard deviation of, say
only .05). The actual behavior of the defendant, relying only on the
patient's self-reported history and discontinuing all medications while
trying to stabilize the patient on a tapering dosage of Serax was rated
with a much smaller probability, .03. Thus there would be strong evi-
dence to present to a jury showing Bernard's professional conduct falls
short of the customary standard of care. If these data had been real
responses from a legally valid sample, the aggregate utility function
would provide empirical definitions of the customary standard of care
for detoxification cases similar to Soileau.
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Figure 1 also displays the aggregate utility function for the reason-
ably prudent physician data.1-3 The hypothetical example depicts a
situation in which the customary standard is different (lower) than
the accepted practice standard. Although the law of a jurisdiction
might only allow the customary standard to be presented, making
available to jurors and thereby future plaintiffs and defendants both
standards serves the function of announcing the accepted norms of the
medical community. Presumably the doctors should strive for the
ideal standard while society, acting through the courts, should accept
no care that falls below the customary standard.
I selected a case that was medically uncomplicated and of intrinsic
interest to psychology and law scholars to illustrate the decision ana-
lytic technique. Nonetheless, the methodology for establishing empir-
ical standards of care is easily translated to any professional
negligence claim. It is not limited to any specific specialty and in fact
is not limited to medical negligence in general.
The approach has several distinct advantages over the traditional
approach of calling one or two medical experts to testify about what
they believe is the standard of care in specific circumstances. First,
unlike the experts in Soileau, physicians need not testify as to what
others will do in the situation in question, they only need to testify as
what they would do. This approach determines the normative stan-
dard by drawing an adequate sample representative of the relevant
professional community. Second, such an approach is likely to have
less systematic error because it is based on a larger sample size than
one or two experts.
Third, the problem of the "conspiracy of silence" is mostly avoided
because doctors do not testify expressly against any other physician. It
is not necessary for the defendant's identity to be revealed. Nonethe-
less, one could argue that if physicians become aware that the data is
being collected for litigation of a specific case, they may empathize
with the unknown defendant and intentionally or unintentionally es-
timate higher probabilities for treatment plans lower on the accepta-
bility scale than the treatment that was administered by the
defendant. Orne1 4 refers to the tendency of experiments to provide
hints about the hypothesis of the researcher as demand characteris-
tics. To prevent demand characteristics from threatening the validity
of the decision survey, the investigator should simply not discuss with
the respondent which treatment plan was selected by the actual de-
fendant in the case. If the results of the investigation were to be used
as evidence in litigation, all other information relevant to the case, ex-
113. For the accepted practice standard of care analysis see King, supra note 11.
114. Orne, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment With Particular
Reference to Demand Characteristics and their Implications, 17 AM. PSYCHoLO-
GIST 776 (1962).
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cept the defendant's actual treatment plan, should be presented to the
respondent.
After the respondent completed the decision task, the defendant's
actions could be revealed to the respondent during a debriefing ses-
sion. This discussion should make it apparent to the reader that in
current trials the demand characteristics of the case at bar are likely
to be much more powerful than the demand characteristics of the de-
cision survey. Expert witnesses in malpractice cases who testify about
customary standards of care are likely to be biased by actions of coun-
sel prior to and during the testimony. The hints present in a decision
survey are likely to be less influential than those that are both deliber-
ately and inadvertently infused into the trial process. In fact, it could
be argued that a strength of the survey methodology is that it reduces
the power of the demand characteristics that are normally a part of
litigation.115
A fourth advantage is the flexibility of data analysis to treat issues
of locality and witness specialty. Compared to the time required to
testify at a trial, this research requires only a small amount of each
physician's time. It is therefore possible to restrict the data collection
to a specific specialty group and "locality" of qualified doctors, but at
the same time to sample widely within that population. Alternatively,
the researcher may choose to open up the sample to include a wide
variety of specialties and locations rather than restricting the popula-
tion. Statistical analyses could then be conducted to isolate locality
and specialty effects and determine if they are sufficiently large to jus-
tify limiting the final standard of care curve by locality and specialty.
The final advantage is that the procedure does not assume that
there is a consensus for every malpractice complaint. It may well turn
out that there is no customary treatment for a particular circum-
stance. The results may fail to turn up a single option with a high
descriptive probability and a low standard deviation. It may even fail
to turn up a small range of moderately high probability treatment
plans. Instead, it may show that there is no consensus about the stan-
dard of care for a particular problem. That is, the data may yield a
large number of equal probability alternatives with large variances.
Under such a situation it is fair to say that there really is no consensus
about treatment. The court then could either rule that the defendant
was not negligent because his professional conduct breached no duty
of care, or it may rely on the accepted practice standard to rule on a
particular case. It would seem that knowledge of this type would
115. Note that features to control for order effects and carryover effects (ie., counter
balancing procedures) could be built directly into the methodology of this model
as could techniques for measuring the reliability of the approach. These issues
and more advanced statistical analyses are outside the scope of this article.
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cause tort decisions to be based more on social fact and less on social
assumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that there is a separate role for psycholegal jurispru-
dence in the law of negligence, specifically in the -area of professional
negligence. The law of tort functions not only to serve retributive
needs, compensate victims, and deter wrongdoers but also to educate
people about the norms of society. With regard to medical malpractice
law, the role of moral educator is best served when the law defines
standards of care based on a representative sample of legally qualified
experts rather than on the testimonies of one or two professionals.
Making the implicit standard explicit by decision theory techniques
announces to future plaintiffs, defendants, and lawyers what the com-
mon law requires from physicians. It instructs the physicians and at
the same time motivates them to achieve the standards set out in the
symbols of the law. Perhaps, most importantly the standards are sug-
gested by the consensus of physicians with the assistance of Social
scientists. While the courts retain the final decision about standards,
the content of the standards are not based on the opinions of one or
two experts, nor is the content determined by judges, jurors, or social
scientists. The norms would represent the collective judgment of a
community of professionals summarized by researchers and evaluated
by judges and jurors. In short they would reflect the interests of the
profession as well as the society at large.
Empirical standards of care have implications for applications as
well as research. Consider first some of the possible applications in
the litigation process. Establishing predictable standards would assist
lawyers during preparation and courtroom stages of a case. Attorneys
would be able to evaluate the worth of a case with more ease if there
was a collection of empirically determined standards of care available
for their inspection. A lawyer would simply need to identify a stan-
dard based on case facts similar to the one at bar, and compare the
professional conduct of her or his client to the available empirical
standards. Evaluation of the strength of any case would be much
more certain at the early stages of litigation.
If insurance companies were aware of the empirical and accepted
standards of care for common areas of litigation, they would be able to
better predict the outcomes of suits and would be more likely to settle
in cases where the prospects of winning were weak. At the same time,
the insurance companies would know when it wag wise to bring the
cases to trial based on an inspection of empirical standard tables. The
result of such knowledge would likely reduce the costs of malpractice
litigation and thus lower the insurance premiums paid by physicians.
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In the long run this strategy could have a significant impact on allevi-
ating the crisis of affordability.
The uncertainties of proffering expert witnesses would be greatly
reduced if evidence collected by decision surveys was used to supple-
ment the testimonies of independent physicians. Having investigated
and documented the standard of care for the case at bar, counsel for
the plaintiff and/or defense would be secure in their knowledge of
professional custom. Direct and cross examinations of expert wit-
nesses could be guided and directed toward the data collected in the
decision survey. Attorneys who were more informed about customary
practice would be at a distinct advantage compared to those who relied
only on the opinions of one or two experts.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly from the viewpoint of the
social scientist, empirical standards of care open up a new and exciting
area of theory and research. Questions about which factors influence
evaluations of the standards of care and differences in physician utility
functions as a result of education, background, gender, empathy, local-
ity, and urbanization are just a sample of legally relevant and psycho-
logically meaningful problems. Theories of decision making that focus
on cognitive structures of physicians, the influence of prior informa-
tion, and cognitive availability could be brought to bear on these le-
gally relevant issues. The purpose of this manuscript was to raise
some legally relevant questions and suggest a decision analytic meth-
odology capable of providing some answers. The challenge to conduct
the research is, as always, left to the ingenuity of individual social
scientists.
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TABLE 1
TWELVE TREATMENT PLANS AVAILABLE TO
PHYSICIANS IN THE SOILEAU SCENARIO
Initial Treatment (included in all 12 plans)
The physician took a complete medical history from the patient
and learned that he had a long history of mental and physical ail-
ments, treatments, and hospitalizations. The patient reported that he
currently and for the past five years had been taking four prescribed
medicines: Etraphon Forte, Tranxene, Stelazine, and Thorazine. Dur-
ing the interview the patient appeared calm and alert and showed no
symptoms of psychotic behavior.
1. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
and learns that-the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physician
systematically removes the prescribed medications, one at a time,
leading ultimately to discontinuation of all unnecessary drugs. For
the purpose of easing the detoxification process the doctor prescribes
Serax in tapered dosages. (CRX)
2. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
and learns that the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physi-
cian maintains the patient only on those prescribed medications that
the physician believes, based on his best medical judgment, are needed
to control his mental problems and discontinues the others. For the
purpose of easing the detoxification process the doctor prescribes
Serax in tapered dosages. (CMX)
3. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
and learns that the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physi-
cian discontinues all the prescribed medications. For the purpose of
easing the detoxification process the doctor prescribes Serax in
tapered dosages. (CSX)
4. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
and learns that the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physi-
cian systematically removes the prescribed medications, one at a time,
leading ultimately to discontinuation of all unnecessary drugs. No ad-
ditional medications are prescribed. (CRN)
5. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
and learns that the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physician
maintains the patient only on those prescribed medications that the
physician believes, based on his best medical judgment, are needed to
control his mental problems and discontinues the others. No addi-
tional medications are prescribed. (CMN)
6. The current physician consults with the patient's previous doctor
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and learns that the patient is a diagnosed schizophrenic. The physi-
cian discontinues all the prescribed medications. No additional medi-
cations are prescribed. (CSN)
7. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctor. The physician systematically removes the prescribed medica-
tions, one at a time, leading ultimately to discontinuation of all unnec-
essary drugs. For the purpose of easing the detoxification process the
doctor prescribes Serax in tapered dosages. (HRX)
8. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctor. The physician maintains the patient only on those prescribed
medications that the physician believes, based on his best medical
judgment, are needed to control his mental problems and discontinues
the others. For the purpose of easing the detoxification process the
doctor prescribes Serax in tapered dosages. (HMX)
9. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctor. The physician discontinues all prescribed medications. For
the purpose of easing the detoxification process the doctor prescribes
Serax in tapered dosages. (HSX)
10. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctor. The physician systematically removes the prescribed medica-
tions, one at a time, leading ultimately to discontinuation of all unnec-
essary drugs. No additional medications are prescribed. (HRN)
11. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctors. The physician maintains the patient only on those prescribed
medications that the physician believes, based on his best medical
judgment, are needed to control his mental problems and discontinues
the others. No additional medications are prescribed. (HVIN)
12. The current physician does not consult with the patient's previous
doctor. The physician discontinues all prescribed medications. No ad-
ditional medications are prescribed. (HSN)
Note: Abbreviations and/or numbers associated with each treatment
plan correspond with labelled treatment plans in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1.
AGGREGATE PROBABILITY FUNCTIONS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL EVALUATIONS OF
TREATMENT PLANS.
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